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 Abstract 
 
The social, political and cultural issues faced by organizations and their senior management team 
in the delivery and adoption of strategic projects, is highly complex and problematic. Despite a 
mature body of literature, increasing levels of practitioner certification, application of standards 
and numerous government initiatives, improvements in success have been minimal. In this study 
we analyse the key underlying factors surrounding the failure of Information Systems (IS) projects 
and explore the merits of articulating a narrative that focusses on senior management embracing 
practical pessimism. Specifically, we develop a hypothesis supported by empirical study that 
leverages expert’s views on the dominance and interrelationships between failure factors within 
PRINCE2® project stages using an Interpretive Ranking Process (IRP). Our findings establish how 
the concept of dominance between individual failure factors can necessitate senior management to 
make key informed and timely decisions that could potentially influence project outcomes based on 
an empirical derived, interpretive predictive framework. 
 
Keywords – Interpretive Ranking Process, Information Systems, project failure, factor dominance. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The inability of organizations to deliver consistent, successful project outcomes has been an ongoing 
theme for many years within academic study and practitioner analysis. Studies have synthesized the key 
facets of Information Systems (IS) project performance, success and failure, and organizational change 
initiatives (Dwivedi et al., 2013; Hughes et al., 2015; Nudurupati et al., 2015), highlighting many of the 
underlying contributory factors and root causes (Fenech and Raffaele, 2013). Unfortunately, projects 
seem to grossly overspend, collapse without realizing benefits (Barker and Frolick, 2003;  Conboy, 2010; 
Standish Group, 2013), are abandoned mid-way through the lifecycle, or are delivered with such low 
levels of adoption that the project business case becomes fundamentally redundant (Hughes et al., 2015; 
Pan et al., 2008). Organizations seem unable to learn the lessons of failure (Bakker et al., 2013; 
Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016; Kerzner, 2015; Verner et al., 2008) demonstrating an inability to align the 
complexities of different stakeholder perspectives (Bryde, 2005; Heeks, 2006) and deliver consistent 
positive outcomes. Studies have highlighted and debated many of the key issues facing senior managers 
involved in project initiatives in the context of benefits realization and return on investment where 
historically, key project actors have been measured on short term tactical performance rather than longer 
term strategic objectives (Atkinson, 1999; Bryde, 2005). Researchers have highlighted the key issues 
surrounding inadequate and late stage benefits definition (Newell et al., 2004) and the inability of senior 
management to retain a realism perspective on the likelihood of benefits realization within strategic 
enterprise projects (Barker and Frolick, 2003; Scarbrough et al., 2015; Willcocks and Currie, 1997). 
However, senior managers are faced with the unenviable predicament of accepting the inevitability of 
innovative organizational change and the associated projects that bring this about, but at the same time 
all too aware of the complexities, stakeholder resistance and risks to the organization; and by association 
- their individual careers if they do not demonstrate effective sponsorship and engagement throughout the 
lifecycle of project initiatives (Stensaker and Langley, 2010; Wilson et al., 1994).    
    Researchers have attempted to shed light on these issues with studies presenting various frameworks 
that contextualize success and failure (DeLone and McLean, 2003; Sauer, 1993) through the lens of 
explanatory and predictive based models. However, despite a general greater understanding of the 
underlying concepts surrounding IS project failure together with increased attempts at professionalizing 
the IS industry with practitioner certification and rigorous standards and methods, the impact on 
outcomes has frustratingly, been minimal (Standish Group, 2013).  
    The increased emphasis on: desired value, post launch benefits realization, management of user 
resistance, top management support and early stage implementation of organizational change 
management, have all helped to move the industry on from the traditional focus on time, cost and quality, 
the so called iron triangle (Atkinson, 1999; Kerzner, 2013; Young and Poon, 2013). This stakeholder 
centric approach is generally credited with improving success rates with relatively recent industry based 
studies highlighting a mediocre 10% increase in project success compared to 2004 (Standish Group, 
2013). However, although any change in outcomes is welcome, organizations still appear to be unable to 
consistently deliver successful IS initiatives within an industry that seems incapable of learning the 
lessons of failure. This poses a huge dilemma for senior management, who often recognize the business 
criticality of technology and change, but are all too aware of the potential risks to the organization and 
their careers, if projects end in complete failure. Whilst many researchers and practitioners accept the 
inevitability of failure (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016; Hughes et al., 2015; Sitkin, 1992), especially in large 
and complex projects (Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standish Group, 2013), the assessment and predictability 
of associative and possibly - more critical failure based on assessment of factor interrelationships, 
together with the positioning of an alternative more realistic pragmatic based narrative, seems to be gap 
in the literature.      
    This study attempts to address these issues and focuses on the assessment of the criticality 
(dominance) of causal links between IS failure factors and their potential impact on project outcomes. 
Specifically, we align with certain aspects of the literature in embracing the inevitability of project 
failure, the practical pessimistic perspective. This more pragmatic mindset approaches the problem of 
project failure accepting that failure at some level is highly likely (Cinite et al., 2009; Scott and Vessey, 
2000; Wilson et al., 1994) and that organizations should concentrate on mitigating the impacts of 
catastrophic failure rather than articulating a preventative narrative. We outline an early warning signs 
centric approach underpinned by an empirically derived methodology titled - Interpretive Ranking 
Process (IRP) that builds a dominance matrix and interpretive ranking model of the key constructs 
(Haleem et al. 2012, Luthra et al. 2014; Sushil, 2009). This paper examines the key interrelationships of 
IS failure factors in the context of their inherent influence and dominance over one another mapped to 
PRINCE2® project stages. The PRINCE2® method was selected due to its wide adoption within 
organizations and standardization across projects, it is a structured method with a formal project stage 
structure and is widely understood within the academic and practitioner community. Furthermore, as 
public sector failure seems to feature highly in the literature (Hughes et al., 2015) where PRINCE2® is 
extensively used, we assert that the selection of this method is pertinent.   
    We position this research as the first study to our knowledge that provides this theoretical contribution 
to the body of literature. We hypothesize that our research can yield an improved more informed and 
empirically derived narrative that can drive senior management decision-making at key stages in the 
project lifecycle in order to mitigate catastrophic project failure. 
 
The remaining content of this paper is structured around the following sections: Theoretical Background 
and Problem Definition, Research method - IRP Method and Findings, Discussion of Results, 
Conclusions. 
   
 
2. Theoretical Background and Problem Definition 
 
The literature has highlighted the intricacies and complexities of attempting to define and classify project 
failure and the key factors that contribute to poor project outcomes. Studies seem to agree on a consensus 
that IS projects, especially large complex projects are rarely delivered successfully (Scarbrough et al. 
2015; Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standish Group, 2013; Wilson et al. 1994) highlighting the stark reality 
that failure at some level is inevitable. Researchers have attempted to categorize and interpret failure via 
a number of separate narratives (Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Flowers, 1997; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; 
Sauer, 1993; Standish Group, 2013), each articulating key concepts of project failure and how it should 
be interpreted. In reality, due to the multiplicity of stakeholder influence and perspectives, success and 
failure cannot be judged solely on one measure, emphasizing the need to assess a number of criteria 
(Dwivedi et al. 2015; Kerzner, 2015; Pinto and Mantel, 1990). The reality is that the existing research 
highlights that no: one size fits all agreed set of criteria exists within the literature to define project 
failure, despite the number of frameworks and models that have been developed to contextualize this 
area (Hughes et al., 2015). Generally, more recent studies seem to align with the actuality perspectives 
set out in Sauer (1993) and where success and failure are considered from a more strategic narrative in 
the context of: desired business value, benefit realization and stakeholder support Kerzner (2015), rather 
than the traditional emphasis on financial, timescale and focus on technical structures (Fincham, 2002).  
     The body of research to date has generally tended to focus on a number of key themes: i) project 
failure in the context of listing the key reasons for failure via actual case studies, (Brown and Jones, 
1998; Gauld, 2007; McDermott et al. 2013; Mitev, 1996; Newell et al. 2004), ii) studies highlighting of 
many of the top factors that can contribute to failure based on a broader review of the literature (Dwivedi 
et al., 2013; Ewusi-Mensah, 2003; Fenech and Raffaele, 2013; Nelson, 2007), iii) specific focus on 
individual factors as part of a contributory narrative: (Bakker et al. 2013; Cinite et al., 2009)    iv) studies 
that seek to explain and categorize success and failure using models or frameworks to aid understanding 
of the constituents of project outcomes (Flowers, 1997; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Sauer, 1993). 
The perspectives of success and failure outlined in Fincham, (2002) highlight the significant effort 
expended in the literature in the normative and rational contexts in an effort to prevent and predict 
failure. The research highlighted stakeholder experiences from two case studies to articulate different 
narratives on success and failure highlighting the actualities and critical influence of perspective. 
Fincham, (2002) aligns with previous studies (Sitkin 1992) concluding that organizations may need to 
experience failure at some level to drive success. The fear of failure can be a key innovative constraint in 
many organizations especially those with a track record of failing projects. This can lead to senior 
management demonstrating reluctance to sponsor new initiatives for fear of reputational damage when 
problems occur (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016), resulting in middle ranking management appointed to key 
governance roles and potentially struggling to deliver successfully (Hughes et al., 2015).  
    Although the extant literature has developed a narrative for individual cases of project failure based on 
specific case studies (Barker and Frolick, 2003; Gauld, 2007) and empirical evidenced research (Bartis 
and Mitev, 2008; Bussen and Myers, 1997), there is no universally accepted diagnosis as to why projects 
fail (Kerzner, 2015). Organizations have attempted to address project failure by investment in standards, 
effective governance and project management certification. However these initiatives seem to have 
collectively yielded minimal results (Standish Group, 2013). Current projects seem to fail for more or 
less the same reasons as historical failures, despite decades of academic research (Dwivedi et al., 2015; 
Lyytinen and Robey, 1999), highlighting either the potential of misdirected academic focus (Fincham, 
2002; Young, 2005) or the reality that many organizations seem to be an unable or unwilling to learn the 
lessons of failure (Kerzner, 2015).  
    Accepting the evidence-based narrative implicit from the literature, that significant numbers of 
projects will inevitably experience failure at some level (Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standish Group 2013), 
some researchers have explored this topic from an early warning signs perspective (Kappelman et al. 
2006; Park et al., 2009). The net effect of this approach is an emphasis on practical pessimism rather than 
one exhibiting over-optimism (Kerzner, 2013; Hughes et al., 2015) requiring perhaps an embracing of 
failure or certainly a reassessment of some of the negative connotations of failure (Birkinshaw and Haas, 
2016; Sitkin 1992) from senior management. The emphasis within the literature on citing the key reasons 
for project failure, either from the case study or empirical research perspective, although providing 
valuable further insight, does not present a clear road-map to avoiding catastrophic failure. Which 
Failure Factors (FFs) are most relevant in terms of project impact? Is organizational project maturity a 
mitigating factor? Are FFs interrelated and are certain factors likely to lead to further more critical 
failure? Are certain FF more critical in terms of impact on the project depending on where in the project 
lifecycle they occur? The extant literature - whilst succeeding at some level on providing an informed 
narrative on many of these questions, generally fails to provide a deeper universalistic debate on factor 
interrelationships and predictivity of IS project failure at key points in the project lifecycle. These facts 
contextualize the predicament in many organizations where risk averse senior managers actively avoid 
failure, rather than seeing managed failure as a direct consequence of innovation and creativity 
(Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016).      
    In an attempt to address these issues, this study aims to further our understanding of FF 
interrelationships, specifically, the dominance between individual FFs and addressing the issues of 
criticality between factors. Furthermore, we approach this topic from the project lifecycle perspective 
recognizing that the risk to the project can vary depending on when the FF materializes (Fincham, 2002) 
and the potential impact on the project as a whole, at that stage in the lifecycle. Our approach builds on 
the research outlined in Hughes et al. (2016) where the interrelationships between IS project FFs are 
explored using an Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) methodology, but is limited by its inability to 
identify dominance between factors and provide any project stage specific context. We assert that the 
identification of project stage specific, failure factor dominance, has the potential to guide and inform 
senior management on the impact and consequences of early stage failure, thereby, enabling action to be 
taken to mitigate complete project failure further on in the project lifecycle. These observations provide 
the contextual background for our research question: Accepting the practical pessimistic viewpoint that 
failure at some level is inevitable - can the ranking of dominant relationships between individual FFs 
demonstrate an appropriate mechanism to effect a hierarchy of factors specific to key stages in the 
PRINCE2® project lifecycle, thereby providing senior management with a mechanism to identify and 
potentially mitigate further and potentially more catastrophic project failure?   
    We position this research as the first study (to our knowledge) to apply the IRP method in the context 
of IS projects and the also the first to explore the impact of FF dominance within individual PRINCE2® 
project stages.   
 
 
3. IRP Method and Findings 
 
IRP is a structured method for identifying dominance between variables building on the strengths and 
limitations of the intuitive and rational choice methods using a structured step-by-step matrix driven 
approach (Sushil, 2009). The key steps in the IRP method are outlined in figure 1.    
 
Step 2:  Clarify contextual relationships between A and P variables.
Step 3:  Create a Cross Interaction Binary Matrix between A and P 
variables denoting     a relationship exis ts and      no relationship 
exists.
Step 1:  Identify set of action variables (A) to be ranked against each 
other and set of performance variables (P) for reference.
Step 4:  Develop Cross Interaction Interpretive Matrix for  each 
instance of     i.e. where a relationship  exists  between A and P  
within the Cross Interaction Binary Matrix
Step 5:  Create Interpretive Logic Knowledge Base from Cross 
Interaction Interpretive Matrix using pairwise comparison between 
A* variables against each P* variable to define the dominating 
relationships. 
Step 7:  Convert the Dominating Interaction Matrix to a final 
Dominance Matrix identifying the  net d ominance and ranking 
dominance of each of the variables for all dominating and being 
dominated relationships.
Step 6:  Sum the relationship instances for each pairwise comparison 
for all dominating and being dominated relationships to create a 
Dominating Interaction Matrix.
Requires expert 
participant input
 
 
 
 
The central tenant of IRP is its ability to provide a structured approach to identifying dominance between 
a set of action variables (A) with reference to a set of performance variables (P). IRP relies upon expert 
participant judgment to interpret the dominant relationships and associated logic between the selected 
variables as an integral part of the process. In practice IRP does not require the expert participants to 
articulate the extent of the dominance between the factors, but relies on them to develop the narrative of 
the interpretive logic of dominance for each paired comparison (Haleem et al., 2012, Luthra et al., 2014; 
Sushil, 2009). This study utilizes IRP as the method to identify the dominating relationships between 
project failure factors to yield new insight into the interrelationships and interdependencies between 
factors specific to each project stage.  
 
3.1 IS Failure Factors (FF) 
 
Previous studies within the IS failure literature have synthesized the underlying causes surrounding 
project failure, with many developing a taxonomy of key factors based on extensive review of case 
studies and industry wide reports (Dwivedi, 2013; Hughes et al., 2015; Kappelman et al., 2006; Standish 
Group, 2013; Verner and Abdullah, 2012). Whilst no formal agreed consensus exists within the literature 
on a definitive list of failure factors, many researchers implicitly agree on a number of the commonly 
cited reasons for projects failing. Projects may fail due to a number of factors and the occurrence as well 
as potential impact of specific factors may be influenced by other related factors (Gauld, 2007; Standing 
Figure 1: IRP method  
et al., 2006; Williams, 2006).  The list of factors itemized in table 1 and described further in this section - 
represents a synthesized list of many of the common distinct factors cited in the literature.    
 
Table 1: List of project failure factors 
 
Failure Factor Reference 
A1. Breakdown in relationship between external  
contractor and organization 
Brown and Jones, 1998, Nawi et al. 2011;  
Verner and Abdullah, 2012; Yeo, 2002;  
Warne and Hart,1997 
A2. Inadequate project sponsorship Avison and Wilson, 2002; Busssen and Myers, 1997;  
El Emam and Koru, 2008; Gauld, 2007; Hughes et al. 2015; 
Keil et al. 1998; Lemon et al. 2002; Nixon et al. 2012;  
Pan et al. 2008; Prosci, 2012; Schmidt et al. 2001;  
Standing et al. 2006; Young, 2005.  
A3. Poor business case and weak financial  
management 
Conboy, 2010;Sauer et al. 1997; Standing et al. 2006;  
Ward and Elvin, 1999. 
A4. Poor staff Performance Bussen and Myers, 1997; Conway and Limayem, 2011;  
Michie and West, 2004; Newman and Sabherwal, 1996;  
Rob, 2003.  
A5. Insufficient audit and post mortem process Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski, 1995; Kerzner, 2015;  
Verner et al. 2008. 
A6. Size and complexity of project Gauld, 2007; Hughes et al. 2016; Jones, 2004; Jones, 2006;  
Kerzner, 2013; Mitev, 1996; Nawi et al. 2011;  
Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standish Group, 2013;  
Verner and Abdullah 2012. 
A7. Poor project management Avison and Wilson, 2002; El Emam and Koru, 2008;  
Keil et al. 1998; Nawi et al. 2011; Philip et al. 2009;  
Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standing et al. 2006;  
Verner et al. 2008. 
A8. Poor requirements and scope management Brown and Jones, 1998; Bussen and Myers, 1997;  
El Emam and Koru, 2008; Hughes et al. 2015; Keil et al. 1998; 
Nawi et al. 2011; Pan et al. 2008; Schmidt et al. 2001. 
A9. Poor communication Barker and Frolick, 2003; Gauld, 2007;  
Monteiro de Carvalho, 2014; Philip et al. 2009. 
A10. Poor change management Barker and Frolick 2003; Beynon-Davies 1995;  
Hughes et al. 2016; McGrath 2002; Mitev 1996;  
Buchanan et al. 2005; Burnes 2005; Pettigrew and Whipp 1993 
  
  
3.1.1. Breakdown in relationship between external contractor and organization: 
Studies have highlighted that project failure was directly attributable to a deteriorated working 
relationship between the parties, citing the lack of experience and skillsets of the contractor (Nawi et al. 
2011; Verner and Abdullah, 2012; Yeo, 2002). Many service based organizations and government 
agencies have either outsourced IS support and development, or have retained a core technology group 
that deals with business as usual operations. The net effect of these strategic decisions is a greater 
reliance on the skills, quality and experience of third party organizations and a potential increased risk to 
the project where a sole supplier is responsible for key deliverables (Willcocks and Currie, 1997). 
Inexperience in dealing with suppliers together with an underestimation of the complexities involved in 
large-scale IS outsourcing can increase risks related to the relationship and directly contribute to project 
failure (Brown and Jones, 1998; Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015; Warne and Hart, 1997). Anchoring 
strategic relationships at the organizational level and leveraging inter company collaborations is key 
(Chapman and Corso, 2005; Wiegel and Bamford, 2015), however, organizations seem to fall foul of 
contract interpretation issues leading to expensive legal argument as each party attempts to allocate 
blame and seeks redress when projects fail. 
 
3.1.2. Inadequate project sponsorship  
Projects can go awry and be severely impacted in instances where senior management do not support or 
engage effectively with the project, or appoint inadequate and inexperienced individuals that fail to gain 
the commitment of the stakeholder base (El Emam and Koru, 2008; Keil et al. 1998; Lemon et al. 2002, 
Schmidt et al. 2001; Standing et al. 2006). The literature has highlighted the significant influence that 
committed senior management support and good sponsorship can have on project outcomes (Nixon et al. 
2012; Young, 2005; Young and Poon, 2013) with industry based studies positioning the sponsor role as a 
key predictor for project success or failure (Prosci, 2012). Studies have indicated that instances of 
inadequate management structures, poor exec support and ineffective project sponsorship have been 
significant contributors to poor project outcomes (Avison and Wilson, 2002; Busssen and Myers, 1997; 
Gauld, 2007; Pan et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 1994).  Organizations that appoint a project sponsor that is 
either too inexperienced, viewed by stakeholders as too low in the management hierarchy or too busy to 
devote adequate time to drive the project forward, are likely to experience significant issues (Hughes et 
al., 2015).   
 
3.1.3. Poor business case and weak financial management  
Projects are handicapped from the onset if either the business case is not well defined or events change 
during the project lifecycle that jeopardize ongoing business justification. Instances where project 
budgets have been poorly developed or have not followed a formal estimating and management process 
can force senior management to abandon the project or drastically restrict scope, ultimately negating 
many of the benefits that were defined at the onset. Studies have highlighted instances where a business 
case was poorly defined and project benefits could not be realized (Sauer et al., 1997; Standing et al., 
2006; Ward and Elvin, 1999) and subsequent issues with budget deviations and cost management have 
resulted in failure (Conboy, 2010). 
 
3.1.4. Poor staff Performance 
Project outcomes can be impacted by: poor team dynamics and cohesion, leadership issues, lack of 
motivation, coopetition issues, team collaboration, inadequate individual performance and commitment 
(Bakker et al., 2013; Le Roy and Fernandez, 2015; Michie and West, 2004; Newman and Sabherwal, 
1996; Rob, 2003). Beyond the initial honeymoon period after project commencement, projects can be 
long and drawn out, even when punctuated by key milestones and distinct stages. Retaining key staff and 
energizing the team over long periods of time is problematic (Bussen and Myers, 1997) with an increased 
likelihood of a more pessimistic team narrative as staff are expected to cope with aggressive timescales 
and tight budgets (Conway and Limayem, 2011). 
 
3.1.5. Insufficient audit and post mortem process  
Organizations generally fail to undertake a formal lessons learned or post mortem (Ewusi-Mensah and 
Przasnyski, 1995; Verner et al., 2008). Many organizations conduct post mortems for successful projects 
only, thereby setting in motion a culture of repeating past mistakes and further failure. Project 
management mature organizations are generally more likely to undertake lessons learned activities as 
part of a formal post mortem process (Williams, 2006). Organizations generally omit to undertake formal 
independent project audit or health checks at key stages in the lifecycle missing significant opportunities 
to highlight issues early in the project (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016; Hughes et al., 2015). Organizations 
that choose to initiate audits operated independently from the project and reporting to senior 
management, offer the greatest chance of addressing instances of early failure thereby, potentially saving 
the project from complete failure (Kerzner, 2015). 
 
3.1.6. Size and complexity of project  
Large projects generally are associated with high levels of complexity, timescales often measured in 
years rather than months with disparate multi-disciplined teams and big budgets.  These types of project 
are inherently risky in the context of scope, cost estimation and controls, planning, team management 
and benefit realization (Hughes et al., 2016). Researchers have identified many of the classic large 
project failings namely: poor governance, lack of focus on adoption, issues relating to users 
understanding the system complexities, integration issues (Gauld, 2007; Jones, 2004; Jones, 2006; Mitev, 
1996; Nawi et al. 2011; Scarbrough et al., 2015; Verner and Abdullah, 2012; Wiers, 2002), with studies 
questioning whether large projects should ever be attempted due to their dismal track record and 
inevitability of failure at some level (Scott and Vessey, 2000; Standish Group, 2013). Senior 
management often exhibit over-optimism that projects will result in positive outcomes, as the 
organization has invested significant amounts of time, money and resource (Kerzner, 2013; Hughes et 
al., 2015).  
 
3.1.7. Poor project management  
Failure due to poor project management is a recurrently cited factor in the literature (El Emam and Koru, 
2008; Keil et al., 1998; Verner et al., 2008). Traits such as: inappropriate management style, project 
management immaturity, poor implementation of methodology, inability to effectively control the 
project, are referenced as key factors (Avison and Wilson, 2002; Philip et al., 2009; Scott and Vessey, 
2000; Standing et al., 2006). Large project failures especially those in the public and health related 
sectors, often cite poor project management as one of the key reason for the projects demise (Nawi et al., 
2011; Philip et al., 2009).  
 
3.1.8. Poor requirements and scope management  
Projects can suffer due to poor requirements definition or changing scope further along the project 
lifecycle. Organizations with poor or inadequate processes in place to manage changes to scope or 
effectively track requirements are likely to experience failure at some stage in the project. Failure as a 
result of poor requirements definition and has been referenced in a number of studies (Brown and Jones, 
1998; Bussen and Myers, 1997; El Emam and Koru, 2008; Keil et al., 1998; Nawi et al., 2011; Pan et al., 
2008; Schmidt et al., 2001). The complexities inherent within large and complex projects in the context 
of accurately defining requirements early in the lifecycle, is problematic (Hughes et al., 2015; Pan et al., 
2008).  
 
3.1.9. Poor communication:  
Organizations that have poor stakeholder communication mechanisms in place, immature information 
communication practices (Mutch, 1999) or do not invest targeted resources or effort to ensure this factor 
is sufficiently covered, are likely to suffer the consequences of failure. These issues can be magnified on 
large projects with geographically dispersed teams comprising of a number of separate organizations. 
Communication issues between vendor and organization, poor outcomes resulting from poor staff and 
stakeholder communication, communication barriers, management failings in the mechanisms and 
process of communicating with front line staff; have all been referenced as key factors on failed projects 
(Barker and Frolick, 2003; Gauld, 2007; Monteiro de Carvalho, 2014; Philip et al., 2009). 
 
3.1.10. Poor change management.  
Organizations have historically underestimated the stakeholder impact from changes to working practices 
and interaction with new systems, focusing too much attention on the technical aspects of the project 
(Stensaker and Langley, 2010). Numerous project failures have highlighted that the many facets of both 
individual and organizational change have not been managed successfully, resulting in dire consequences 
for the affected organizations (Barker and Frolick, 2003; Beynon-Davies, 1995; McGrath, 2002). Studies 
attest that managing change within an organization is problematic, requiring the adoption of a 
methodological approach involving stakeholders across the organization to realize consistent successful 
outcomes (Buchanan et al., 2005; Burnes, 2005; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993). Organizations have 
struggled with the cultural aspects of change especially in large government and health related sectors 
where projects have suffered from user resistance, poor change agent performance and related political 
factors (Abubakre et al., 2015; Cinite et al., 2009; McDermott et al., 2013; Sandeep and Ravishankar, 
2014; Warne and Hart, 1997).  
 
 
3.2 Implementation of IRP 
 
IRP requires the use of an expert participant group to interpret the pairwise interactions between the 
variables. The interpretive method literature (ISM, IRP) varies in its approach to the use of expert 
participants. Many studies reference the fact that an expert group was used often stating that they were 
recruited from academia and industry but omitting to identify the size or makeup of the group (George 
and Pramod, 2014; Haleem et al., 2012; Luthra et al., 2014; Shahabadkar et al., 2012; Shyur and Shih, 
2006; Thakkar et al., 2007). Other interpretive based studies state the composition of the expert 
participants and the quantify the composition in the context of academia and industry based experts 
(Agarwal et al., 2007; Bevilacqua et al., 2006; Faisal, 2010; Luthra et al., 2011; Singh et al., 2007). The 
number of participants generally varies between three and six with studies highlighting the limitations of 
exceeding groups of eight due to deteriorating quality of debate and difficulty in gaining consensus 
(Janes, 1998). The five expert participants selected for this study are a group of practitioners drawn from: 
public sector health authority, government agency and finance industries. All have extensive experience 
within their respective industry sectors exhibiting a tacit knowledge of IS projects within structured 
environments and industrial sectors. All of the expert group have experience of PRINCE2®. The method 
of data collection was predominantly a mix of lead researcher led - facilitated focus group and semi 
structured interviews split across two sessions with additional follow-up interviews to clarify disparities. 
In adherence to the IRP method, the role of the lead researcher as facilitator was to ensure commonality 
of understanding, elicitation of views from the experts and consensus amongst the group. Participants 
were initially requested to review the list of factors (table 1) and their descriptions and agree on a set of 
performance factors that would be used as a reference point, these are listed in table 2 (P1 – P10). In the 
context of this study the performance variables should be viewed as a list of factors that could be aligned 
with successful project outcomes that the FFs are measured against within the IRP process. 
 
Table 2: List of performance factors 
 
Performance Factors (p) Description 
P1. Full engagement and committed project sponsorship  
from executive. 
Senior management are fully committed to the  
project and are able to drive the initiative forward.  
P2. Adequate user involvement throughout the project. Users are an integral part of the project team from  
the onset and continue to be closely coupled with  
the project throughout the lifecycle.   
P3. Suitable Skills, experience and style of project  
manager. 
The appointed project manger possesses the  
required experience, capability and management  
style for the project and the organization.  
P4. Optimized project scope. The project and organization has a formal process in 
place that ensures risk, timescales, business case  
and benefits are all factored into scope changes.   
P5. Clear business objectives. The project justification is structured around clear 
business benefits to the organization.  
P6. Effective project maturity and established processes The organization has established structures and  
processes to engender a suitable project culture and 
delivery framework. 
P7. Short stage duration (< 1 yr) year. Project plans are structured to organize the project 
deliverables within short duration stages to ensure 
adequate control is exercised by the senior 
management team.  
P8. Effective benefits management process. Project benefits are clearly identified within the 
business case and formally managed through to 
realization.   
P9. Integrated change and project management. Change and project management are integrated 
early in the project lifecycle and fully supported by 
senior management.  
P10. Established project Audit &  post mortem process.  Lessons learned from previous projects is a 
formalized process and periodic audits are 
undertaken throughout key stages of the project 
reporting to senior management. 
  
As our emphasis is directed toward applying IRP to the PRINCE2® methodology, the pairwise 
comparison between the factors is applied for each stage in the method, namely: Pre-project, Initiation, 
Delivery, and Final delivery stage necessitating the interpretation of a 10x10 matrix at each stage in the 
process. It is accepted that projects may have a number of delivery stages depending on the type of 
project, but for the purposed of this study we have restricted this phase of the project to a single stage. 
The net effect of this approach, is a need to apply the IRP methodology four times, once for each of the 
PRINCE2® stages as set out in figure 2. 
 
Pre-project Initiation Stage Delivery Stages
Final Delivery 
Stage
 
 
 
 
The rational for this approach is a requirement to validate the hypotheses that FFs and the dependencies 
therein, can have greater or lesser relevance and risk to the project depending on the specific stage in the 
project lifecycle. The implementation of IRP in this study is outlined in figure 3, here the steps in the 
methodology are setout as applied specifically for ascertaining the dominance between FFs within 
PRINCE2® project stages.  
 
Figure 2: PRINCE2® stages   
Step 2: Contextual validation and matrix setup   
 Set up required (A* x P*) 10x10 IRP  data 
structures for each stage.  
 Clarify contextual relationships  between A and P  
variable by mapping out each of the factors in 
matrix form to facilitate a pairwise comparison.
 Confirm applicability of pairwise comparison for 
each of the PRINCE2 stages  (Pre-project, 
Initiation, Delivery stages, Final delivery stage).
  
Step 3: Create cross interaction binary matrices 
 Based on expert view – identify existence of any 
relationship between A1 and P1, A1 and P2, A1 
and P3 etc up to A10  – P10.
 Repeat the A* to P*pairwise comparison for each 
PRINCE2 stage identifying all instances of 
relationships between the variables. 
 Populate the cross interaction binary matrices 
between A  and P variables denoting     a 
relationship exists and      no relationship 
exists; for each PRINCE2  stage.
Step 1: Variable se tup and expert identification. 
 Identify and appoint suitable expert participant 
group.
 Select list of IS failure factors (FF) (max of 10) from 
literature as action variables A
 Agree set of performance factors  P (10 of) with 
experts that will be used in  pairwise comparison 
Step 4: Develop interpretive matrices
 Populate cross  interaction interpretive matrices 
for each instance of 1 i.e. where a relationship 
exists between A and P within the cross  
interaction b inary matrices. 
 Based on expert view – develop the narrative of 
each instance of a relationship for each pairwise 
comparison of A* to P* for all PRINCE2 stages. 
Step 5: Create Interpretive logic knowledge base 
table
 Based on expert view – develop the A* to A* 
pairwise dominance for each FF against all 
instances of P from previous matrix.
   Repeat for all identified  ins tances to identify 
dominance between FF (A) for all PRINCE2  
stages .
Step 6: Develop dominating interactions
 For each instance of dominance between FF (A), 
populate the matrices with occurrences of P* 
variables from the interpretive logic knowledge 
base table.    
 Repeat for all dominating and being dominated 
instances for all PRINCE2 stages.
Step 7: Develop dominance matrix and FF ranking
 For each element in  the dominating interactions 
matrix – sum the instances  of P* for all A1 – A10 
references in  the matrix.
 For all A1 to A10 element in matrix, sum the no 
of dominating (D) and no being dominated (B) 
instances. 
 Allocate the final rank dominating figures  based 
on the net dominance (D-B).
 Repeat to generate the specific rank dominance 
for all FF specific to all  PRINCE2 stages.
  Final Ranking of 
FF   for each 
PRINCE2 stage
 
 
 
 
 
Each of the FFs listed A1-A10 were analyzed by the expert participants against the relevant P1 – P10 
performance factors using a pairwise comparison to populate the initial matrices where a contextual 
relationship was deemed to exist. The interpretive logic was then extended to populate the knowledge 
base table and dominating interactions matrix based on the dominance of each FF (A1-A10), against 
each instance of the performance factors (P1-P10). The process was repeated for each of the PRINCE2® 
stages as set out in figure 2 where the variances in dominance specific to each stage are explored. The 
final dominance matrices produced within step 7 in the IRP process (figure 3) highlights the ranking of 
each of the FFs. The output of this step is highlighted in tables 3 – 6 where each of the dominance 
matrices are populated from the summation of the dominance interactions from the interpretive 
knowledge base matrix. The rank dominance of the FF specific to each stage is listed. The final ranking 
is developed from the net instances of no. of dominating (D) and no. being dominated (B) using the 
equation:- Rank = D-B.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: IRP Implementation for FF ranking 
Table 3: Dominance matrix – Pre-project stage 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rank dominance for each FF is listed in the final column of the matrices highlighted in tables 3 – 6 
and denoted in the form I – X. “I” signifies the highest level of ranking and “X” the least significant 
ranking for the set of FFs.  
  
4. Discussion of Findings 
 
The final ranking of the FFs for each PRINCE2® project stage is listed in figure 4. The individual 
rankings highlight the perceived dominance of certain FFs within each of the stages. In other words, the 
Table 4: Dominance matrix – Initiation stage 
Table 5: Dominance matrix – Delivery stage(s) 
Table 6: Dominance matrix – Final delivery stage 
level of importance that senior management should attach to key FFs as they arise during each stage of 
the project. The results highlight the variance in ranking between FFs within separate stages 
demonstrating the perceived changing impact of each FF as the project progresses through the lifecycle. 
This specific point is key, in that the literature has generally identified FFs in the overall project context 
(Fenech and Raffaele, 2013) rather than any specific focus on individual project stages and the potential 
impact at each stage.  
 
Pre-Project stage P variable interaction
A2: Inadequate project sponsorship Rank I P1, P6
A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem Rank II P1, P6, P10
A10: Poor change management Rank II P1, P6, P9
A9: Poor Communication Rank III P1, P6
A6: Size and complexity of project Rank IV P6
A7: Poor project mgt Rank V -
A8: Poor requirements and scope mgt Rank V -
A3: Poor business  case and financial mgt Rank VI -
A4: Poor staff performance Rank VI -
A1: Breakdown in relationship between external 
       contractor and organization Rank VI -
  .
Initiation stage P variable interaction
A3: Poor business  case and financial mgt Rank I P1, P3, P5, P8, P10
A7: Poor project mgt Rank II P1, P3, P6, P9, P10
A8: Poor requirements and scope mgt Rank III P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P9, P10
A6: Sze and complexity of project Rank IV P1, P3, P4, P6, P7, P10
A10: Poor change management Rank V P1, P2, P3, P6, P9, P10
A2: Inadequate project sponsorship Rank VI P1, P6
A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem Rank VII P1, P6, P10
A9: Poor communication Rank VIII P1, P2, P6, P9, P10
A4: Poor staff performance Rank IX P1, P3
A1: Breakdown in relationship between external 
       contractor and organization Rank X -
Delivery Stage(s) P variable interaction
A7: Poor project mgt Rank I P1, P3, P4, P6, P7, P9, P10
A8: Poor requirements and scope mgt Rank II P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P9, P10
A6: Sze and complexity of project Rank III P1, P3, P4, P6, P7 ,P8, P10
A10: Poor change management Rank IV P1, P2, P3, P6, P9, P10
A3: Poor business  case and financial mgt Rank V P1, P3, P5, P8, P10
A9: Poor communication Rank VI P1, P2, P3, P6, P9, P10
A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem Rank VII P1, P6, P10
A2: Inadequate project sponsorship Rank VIII P1, P3, P6, P10
A1: Breakdown in relationship between external 
       contractor and organization Rank IX P3, P6, P10
A4: Poor staff performance Rank X P1, P3
Final delivery Stage P variable interaction
A10: Poor change management Rank I P1, P2, P3, P6, P9, P10
A7: Poor project mgt Rank II P1, P3, P4, P6, P7, P9, P10
A8: Poor requirements and scope mgt Rank III P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P9, P10
A3: Poor business  case and financial mgt Rank IV P1, P3, P5, P8, P10
A6: Sze and complexity of project Rank V P3, P4, P6, P7 ,P8, P10
A2: Inadequate project sponsorship Rank VI P1, P3, P6, P10
A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem Rank VII P1, P6, P10
A9: Poor communication Rank VIII P1, P2, P3, P6, P9
A1: Breakdown in relationship between external 
       contractor and organization Rank IX P3, P6, P10
A4: Poor staff performance Rank X P1, P3
 
 
 
 
The key observations from the IRP FF ranking listed in figure 4 are as follows: 
  
Figure 4: IRP FF ranking for each stage 
 The factor A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem is identified in the pre-project stage as a high 
ranking factor identifying the significance of learning lessons from previous projects and the 
potential of early audit to ensure project feasibility is scrutinized adequately prior to business case 
approval. The ranking signifies that failings during feasibility could significantly impact the project 
at this early stage (Barker and Frolick 2003; Pan et al. 2008) potentially carrying risk throughout the 
project if not addressed early in the lifecycle. This factor has a mid-to lower level ranking for each of 
the subsequent stages highlighting that failings in this area are important, but do not dominate as 
highly as many other factors as the project progresses through to delivery.  
 The factor A7: Poor project management is allocated a mid ranking within the pre-project stage 
highlighting that as the project is still within feasibility, the project manager may not as yet be 
appointed or their impact may not be a factor in this early phase. The factor A4: Poor staff 
performance is categorized as having low levels of dominance not just in the pre-project stage but in 
each of the subsequent stages and is allocated the lowest level of dominance in the delivery and final 
delivery stages of the project. This highlights that although poor staff performance is a key factor in 
isolation, when compared in the context of ranking with the remaining factors, is perceived as not 
being dominant.   
 The Initiation stage identifies the factors - A7: Poor project management and A8: Poor requirements 
and scope management as ranked II and III respectively highlighting the increasing dominance of 
poor project management as a factor and the criticality of issues relating to poor requirements and 
scope at this early stage in the project.    
 Although the factor A2: Inadequate project sponsorship is allocated a high ranking in the pre-project 
stage highlighting the importance of adequate early top management support for new initiatives 
within organizations (Hughes et al. 2015; Prosci 2012), this factor is ranked lower for the initiation 
and delivery stages. This finding could be viewed as detracting somewhat from aspects of the 
literature where studies advocate top management support as a strong predictor for success and 
failure (Prosci, 2012; Standing et al. 2006). We argue that this finding does not necessary deviate 
from previous studies in that the ranking should be seen in the context of other factors and that the 
PRINCE2® methodology advocates delegated authority for the project manager via the management 
by exception principle. The factor however, is ranked higher for the Final delivery stages highlighting 
the increased importance of top management support during final delivery and subsequent benefits 
realization, where adoption needs to be supported beyond delivery.  
 The factor A7: Poor project management features highly in the rankings for the initiation, delivery 
and final delivery stages. This reflects the widely held consensus within the literature on the impact 
of effective project management (Kerzner, 2015) and the major issues when this factor becomes a 
significant problem (Standing et al., 2006; Verner et al., 2008). 
 The dominance of the factor A10: Poor change management features at a consistently high level 
through all stages of the project. The inability of senior management to effect successful 
organizational change is a key contributor to project failure (Brown and Jones, 1998; Fitzgerald and 
Russo, 2005; Gauld, 2007). The top ranking for the final delivery stage reflects the impact on positive 
outcomes when poor change management becomes a factor at this late stage in the project, when 
delivery and subsequent benefits realization is impacted by user resistance and adoption issues.  
 The factor A6: Size and complexity of project is consistently ranked relatively highly throughout all 
stages of the project with the highest dominance identified in the pre-project and delivery stages. 
Issues relating to size and complexity can result in significant problems for organizational senior 
management (Jones, 2004; Mitev, 1996; Verner and Abdullah, 2012), with studies highlighting the 
inevitability of failure inherent with this genre of project (Scott and Vessey, 2000). Addressing size 
and complexity issues early in the lifecycle is a key task for senior management and one that requires 
practical mitigating strategies to drive successful outcomes.  
 
 
4.1 Implications for Practice 
 
The results highlight a correlation between FF ranking and specific PRINCE2® project stages, in that 
specific factors are judged to be impacted, depending on where in the lifecycle the FF materializes. This 
finding has clear implications for senior management when assessing the wider threat to the project when 
problems arise. The findings contextualized for each of the PRINCE2® project stages are shown in table 
7 – FF ranking order by project stage. 
 
 
 
 
Ranking by stage 
Failure Factor Pre-Project Initiation Delivery Final Delivery 
A1. Breakdown in relationship between  
external contractor and organization 
6 10 9 9 
A2. Inadequate project sponsorship 1 6 8 6 
A3. Poor business case and weak financial mgt 6 1 5 4 
A4. Poor staff Performance 6 9 10 10 
A5. Insufficient audit and post mortem process 2 7 7 7 
A6. Size and complexity of project 4 4 3 5 
A7. Poor project management 5 2 1 2 
A8. Poor requirements and scope management 5 3 2 3 
A9. Poor communication 3 8 6 8 
A10. Poor change management 2 5 4 1 
 
 
The factors A7: Poor project management and A10: Poor change management are identified as 
exhibiting a high degree of ranking correlation within project stages with a maximum variance of +/- 3 
dominance weightings. This finding aligns with aspects of the literature that advocate closer integration 
between change and project management (Hornstein, 2015; Leyland et al. 2009; Oakland and Tanner, 
2007) either in the planning context or through the “lens of knowledge integration” (Soderlund, 2011). In 
practical terms, this finding highlights that senior management should strategically plan for early stage 
alignment of these two disciplines to reduce the potential threat to the project (Hughes et al., 2015). The 
consistent, relatively high ranking of factor A6: Size and complexity of project within each of the stages, 
identifies the significance of this factor and its potential threat to the organization throughout the project. 
The literature has identified that very few large projects are delivered successfully and are ten times more 
likely to fail than smaller less complex projects (Standish Group, 2013). Organizational senior 
management are advised to embrace a more practical pessimistic stance on the likelihood of success for 
projects identified as large and complex, and take steps to mitigate further more catastrophic failure as an 
early lifecycle activity.  
 
4.1.1 Pre-project stage  
The findings highlight a high dominance for the factor A2. Inadequate project sponsorship in this stage, 
highlighting the criticality of executive support to drive the initiative forward during the early phases as 
the project is established. The factor A5: Insufficient audit and post mortem is also identified as a high 
ranking factor during the pre-project stage. Learning the lessons of previous failures is a vital early phase 
step for any project (Kerzner, 2013), however many organizations fail to formalize this process 
(Williams 2008).  Senior managers that fail to apply these lessons are setting themselves up to potentially 
repeat the same mistakes as previous initiatives (Verner et al. 2008). The early stage criticality of 
identifying user resistance and the scope of change are highlighted by the high ranking of A10. Poor 
change management. Senior management would be advised to allocate resources to address these areas 
early in the lifecycle to mitigate the criticality of this risk further on in the project.  
Table 7: FF ranking order by project stage  
 4.1.2. Initiation stage  
The initiation stage highlights the high ranking of the factor A3. Poor business case and weak financial 
management. The results indicate that issues relating to a poor business case and financial management 
are particularly critical to the project during the initiation stage as the project formally defines the 
benefits, gains financial approval and agrees the project plan for the first stage of the project. The results 
highlight the diminishing criticality of this factor as the project progresses through the delivery and final 
delivery stages, indicating the expert participants views on the ability of the PRINCE2® structure and 
processes to mitigate the impact of this factor in subsequent stages. The factor A7. Poor project 
management ranks higher during the initiation stage as the core deliverables of the project are established 
and scoped. The factor A8. Poor requirements and scope management exhibits a high ranking in the 
initiation stage and also in subsequent stages indicating the impact of this factor in relation to other 
factors. Formally managing and controlling project scope and addressing the impact of scope creep is 
key to keeping the project within its financial and time constraints (Kerzner 2013).   
 
4.1.3. Delivery stage  
The significance of the factor A7. Poor project management is highlighted in the results for the delivery 
stage. This indicates the criticality of this factor at this key stage of the project and in subsequent stages. 
Studies have highlighted the criticality of project manager competency looking beyond practitioner 
certification to a more holistic skills set (Crawford et al., 2006) that takes account of real world political 
and conflict resolution attributes (Kerzner 2015). The factor A2. Inadequate project sponsorship is 
surprisingly ranked relatively low within this stage indicating a lack of alignment with previous studies 
that have articulated the detrimental impact of poor project sponsorship at all stages of the project 
lifecycle (Hiatt and Creasey, 2012). This result is explained by the  PRINCE2® principle of management 
by exception where delegated authority from senior management to project management is actioned 
based on agreed defined tolerances. Senior management are advised to ensure adequate controls are 
established to monitor the delicate balance of efficient use of management time and appropriate 
governance processes to assure full control of the project within agreed tolerances.      
 
4.1.4. Final Delivery stage  
The results indicate that factor A10. Poor change management is ranked relatively highly throughout the 
preceding stages but is identified as exhibiting a high ranking for the final delivery stage. The literature 
has identified numerous examples of projects delivering to their perceived criteria based on time, cost 
and quality, but ultimately failing to provide the necessary focus on key change management aspects 
(Barker and Frolick, 2003; Beynon-Davies, 1995; Cinite et al., 2009; McGrath, 2002; McDermott et al., 
2013; Warne and Hart, 1997). Senior management are advised to view change management strategically 
and take steps to ensure these aspects are considered early in the project lifecycle and that resources are 
allocated to the key areas of user resistance and system adoption to ensure benefits are realized.    
 
4.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 
The literature has identified many of the factors associated with IS project failure highlighting the root 
causes that have contributed to poor project outcomes (Dwivedi et al., 2013; Fenech and Raffaele, 2013; 
Gould, 2007; Hughes et al., 2015; Standish Group, 2013). However, although many studies have 
provided extensive analysis of individual FFs and have articulated their individual contribution to failure 
(Bakker et al. 2013; Cinite et al. 2009, Nawi et al. 2011), few have addressed the need for a deeper 
understanding of the dominating interrelationships between FFs, impacting senior management’s ability 
to address project outcome related factors, contextualized for each stage in the lifecycle. Previous studies 
have utilized IRP to explore factor dominance within other genres of research (Haleem et al., 2012; 
Luthra et al., 2014) exploring the suitability of the method and its application. The ISM based 
methodology utilized within Hughes et al., (2016) explored the interrelationships and causal links 
between individual FFs but the study was limited by its inability to identify any priority or dominance 
between factors. We propose a more pragmatic perspective to IS project outcomes by proposing a new 
empirically supported narrative on IS project failure utilizing the existing IRP method that demonstrates 
a changing pattern of factor dominance at each stage of the PRINCE2® project lifecycle, thereby, 
providing new insight and we posit - a valuable alternative perspective on factor relationships. The 
findings represent an important new theoretical contribution to the existing body of literature where a 
more pragmatic position is advocated on the likelihood of project failure. We present this research as the 
first study to apply the IRP method in the context of IS projects and the also the first to explore the 
impact of FF dominance within individual PRINCE2® project stages.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This research is limited by the inherent constraints of IRP, namely its reliance on expert participant 
knowledge and therefore, potential inherent bias. As this study is the first to utilize the method within the 
IS project genre applied to project failure, contextualization and validation of results is problematic. The 
study is also limited by its alignment with PRINCE2® in that further study is needed to validate the 
results with alternative methods. 
    This study highlights the underlying emphasis of many aspects of the IS failure literature that have 
approached this topic from the perspective of a prevention narrative, rather than a practical pessimistic 
viewpoint. We argue the futility of the prevention narrative and present a more pragmatic approach 
recognizing that failure within IS projects is inevitable at some level (Cinite et al, 2009; Scott and 
Vessey, 2000; Wilson et al. 1994) and that senior management are best placed in understanding the 
patterns of failure and learning the key lessons to mitigate overall project failure. This study builds on the 
ISM based research in Hughes et al, (2016) and presents a new approach to the subject based on the 
implementation of IRP to identify key patterns of dominance between FFs within PRINCE2® project 
stages. In addressing the research question posed at the start of this paper, the findings highlight the 
changing patterns of ranking between FFs within individual project stages demonstrating variances in 
potential threats to the organization as the project progresses through the lifecycle, thereby providing 
valuable information to senior management at each stage in the project. The study has identified the 
consistent high levels of dominance for factors A7: Poor project management and A10: Poor change 
management that rank highly throughout the project lifecycle, and the early stage criticality of factors: 
A2. Inadequate project sponsorship and A5. Insufficient audit and post mortem process. Senior 
management are advised to adopt a practical pessimistic mindset and pay specific attention to these key 
factors at an early stage in the project.   
    Future research in the application of IRP as part of a contextualized IS project case study based on the 
outputs of this study, could be a useful mechanism to test the validity of the findings and serve as a test 
of the practical application of the method. 
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